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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
: Case No. 20020332-SC 
vs. 
ADRIAN WHITFIELD GORDON, 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for murder, a first degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-203 (Supp. 2002). This Court has 
jurisdiction over appeals of criminal cases involving first degree felonies pursuant 
to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i) (Supp. 2001). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW1 
Did the evidence suffice to support defendant's conviction for murder, where 
an eyewitness saw defendant stomping on the victim's head? 
When reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of the evidence, the appellate 
court must sustain the trial court's judgment unless, after giving "deference to the 
defendant argues that the sufficiency issue in this case is preserved even though 
defendant did not move the trial court to dismiss for insufficiency. Br. Aplt. at 2. The 
State does not dispute preservation of the claim in this bench trial case. 
1 
trial court's ability and opportunity to evaluate credibility and demeanor," the 
appellate court finds that the judgment is "against the clear weight of the evidence" 
or "reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." 
Goodman, 763 P.2d 786, 786-787 (Utah 1988) (internal quotation and citation 
omitted). The trier-of-fact may draw reasonable inferences from the evidence 
before it. See State v. Coonce, 2001 UT App 355, ^ 6, 36 P.3d 533 (bench trial). 
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND 
State v. 
RULES 
The following relevant provision(s) are included in the Addendum A 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-5-203 (Supp. 2002). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On October 4, 2001, the State filed an information charging defendant with 
murder, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-5J203 
(Supp. 2002). R. 3. Defendant waived his right to a jury trial. R. 30, lOp, 205:3-5, 
207:9-11. A bench trial commenced on December 17, 2001. R. 110, 208 
Following three days of testimony, the trial judge found defendant guilty 
211. On April 5, 2002, the trial court entered judgment, sentencing 
prison term of five years to life. R. 178. Defendant timely appealed. R 
R. 123, 
defendant to a 
181. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS2 
Lee Lundskog, a fifty-year-old group home resident enjoyed visiting local 
convenience stores, where he spent his allowance on soft drinks and lighters for his 
cigarettes. R. 208:29. He often sat in front of a neighborhood 7-Eleven, on the 
southeast end, drinking a soda or smoking a cigarette. R. 209:238. 'That was his 
little corner:' R. 209:237,241. 
On Saturday, September 29, 2001, defendant lured Lee from his corner to a 
secluded area behind the 7-Eleven and brutally killed him by stomping on his head 
between ten and twenty times. R. 208:65-70, 74, 85-86. Lee spent the last half 
hour of his life unconscious in a pool of his own blood behind the store's garbage 
dumpster. R. 209:217, 269-274. 
The Murder 
At approximately 6:30 a.m. that Saturday morning, police and paramedics 
discovered Lee lying on his back on a strip of grass near the northwest corner of the 
7-Eleven located at 1285 North Redwood Road. R. 209:287, 294. Lee was not 
breathing and a cardiac monitor revealed that his heart had stopped. R. 209:362. 
He was bruised and covered in blood from the neck up. R. 209:287-288; Ex. S-18.3 
2The facts are stated in a light most favorable to the verdict. See State v. Harper, 
761 P.2d 570, 570 (Utah App. 1988) (observing in review of bench trial conviction that 
the appellate court "review[s] the facts in the light most favorable to the trial court's 
verdict"). 
3State's Exhibits 15 and 18 show Lee lying next to a cement fence with several 
(continued...) 
3 
The paramedics decided not to resuscitate Lee because his injuries were sol severe 
that he would not have lived. R. 209:363. 
A state medical examiner performed an autopsy during which he discovered 
extensive bruising and multiple abrasions on the right side of Lee's face and a large 
laceration on the right eyebrow. R. 209:217. Lee had a fractured right cheek, 
fractures on both the right and left side of his jaw, and a fracture at the base of his 
skull. Id. Lee also had bruises on the brain and hemorrhaging around the 
within the ventricle, a space within the brain. Id. The medical examiner also 
discovered that Lee had been breathing blood, indicating that he was alive 
breathing for some time after receiving the injuries to his head. Id. He fofind no 
brain and 
and 
other injuries on Lee's body. Id. 
The medical examiner determined that Lee died from craniocerebral injuries 
and ruled Lee's death a homicide. R. 209:218-19. He testified that the in uries to 
Lee's head were consistent with injuries that would be inflicted by "someone 
stomping on [the] head with a shoed foot." R. 209:220. 
Lee was last seen alive by local resident Steven Butcher as he passed by Lee's 
body just before 5:46 a.m. R. 209:274, 210:441. Lee was unconscious and Butcher 
3(...continued) 
missing blocks. The blocks are lying on the ground next to him. Steven Butbher, a local 
resident, stated that the blocks were removed by people climbing over the fence to get to 
the 7-Eleven and that the hole in the fence had been there for a month prior to the murder. 
R. 209:267. The state medical examiner opined that the blocks did not cause Lee's 
injuries. R. 209:216. 
4 
heard him making snoring noises. R. 209:269-74. In the dark, Butcher mistook the 
blood on Lee's face for dark skin coloring and assumed that Lee was drunk and had 
passed out. R. 209:269-70. He did not report what he saw to the clerk at 7-Eleven 
because it was not unusual to find someone passed out between the fence and the 
7-Eleven. R. 209:273. 
Identity of Lee's Attacker 
Evidence adduced at trial showed that defendant was the person who stomped 
on Lee's head. That evidence included the testimonies of Robert Mellen and 
Gustavo Diaz-Hernandez and a videotape recorded by the in-store surveillance 
camera at the 7-Eleven. The State presented the following evidence to the trial 
court: 
• The 7-Eleven had an in-store surveillance camera with an integrated 
clock that recorded images including the cash register, the front door, and 
a few feet to either side of the door. R. 208:39, 48; Ex. S-2. 
• The surveillance camera first recorded Lee arriving at the store Saturday 
morning at 4:51:55. R. 210:423; Ex. S-2. Lee purchased two drinks, 
exited the store, and walked off camera to the south (right). R. 210:424; 
Ex. S-2, 4:55:00. 
• Defendant entered the store at 5:20:45 carrying two white bags and 
wearing a light colored T-shirt, denim shorts, and white tennis shoes. 
R. 210:426-27, 433.4 
4Defendant admitted to Detective James Prior that he was the person depicted on 
the camera entering the store at 5:20:45. R. 210:428. Defendant does not contest on 
appeal that he is the black male recorded by the surveillance camera entering and leaving 
the store three different times between 5:20:45 and 5:32:13. Br. Aplt. at 28. 
5 
The only other patron in the store between 5:22:22 and 5:29:30 was 
Robert Mellen. R. 210:428-37; Ex. S-2. Mellen, who had seen Lee at 
the store on other occasions, noticed Lee "on his little comer" \r\ front of 
the store. R. 209:241, 245-46. 
Defendant exited the store with his packages at 5:24:46 and walked off 
camera to the north (left) while Mellen was paying for his purchases. 
R. 210:430-31; Ex. S-2. 
Defendant briefly reentered the store at 5:25:38 and then followed Mellen 
out at 5:25:26 and walked off camera to the north (left). R. 210 432-35. 
At 5:26, as Mellen backed his truck out, he noticed defendant standing 
next to some pay phones in front of the 7-Eleven and saw defendant 
"waving Lee over to him." R. 209:241, 247, 254. 
One minute later, at 5:27:21, Lee traversed the view of the camera from 
south to north (right to left) toward where Mellen last saw defendant 
standing. R. 210:436; Ex. S-2. This was the last time the surveillance 
camera recorded Lee. Ex. S-2. 
About three minutes later, at approximately 5:30 a.m., Gustavo 
Diaz-Hernandez was walking east on 13th North to catch a ride <bn 
Redwood Road across the street from the 7-Eleven. R. 208:61-^3, 77. 
Diaz-Hernandez heard noises as he passed the 7-Eleven and turted to see 
a man stomp eight or nine times on another man lying between the 
dumpster and the concrete fence near the northwest comer of thp 
7-Eleven. R. 208:65-70. 
Diaz-Hernandez described the attacker as a black male wearing 
colored T-shirt, denim shorts, and white tennis shoes. R. 208:7 
a light 
1-72. 
The area around the dumpster was illuminated by a light attached to the 
side of the 7-Eleven and an overhead lamp. Exs. S-23-26. 
Diaz-Hernandez continued walking to the southwest comer of l|3lh North 
and Redwood Road where he turned and saw the attacker stomp on the 
victim four more times. R. 208:74. 
6 
• Diaz-Hernandez crossed Redwood Road and turned to see the attacker 
leave his victim and enter the 7-Eleven. R. 208:78. 
• Diaz-Hernandez noticed blood on the attacker's right shoe when light 
reflected off the shoe as the attacker entered the 7-Eleven. R. 208:80. 
• At 5:31:18 the in-store surveillance camera recorded defendant entering 
the store for the third time and using the telephone near the register. 
R. 210:439; Ex. S-2. 
Diaz-Hernandez saw the attacker remain in the store for approximately 
one minute and then exit carrying two white bags and walk into the north 
part of the parking lot. R. 208:81. 
• At 5:32:13, the in-store surveillance camera recorded defendant exiting 
the store and walking off camera to the north. R. 210:441; Ex. S-2. 
• Diaz-Hernandez saw the attacker put the two bags in a car that had pulled 
into the parking lot, and return to the victim. R. 208:85. 
• The attacker stomped on the victim seven or eight more times and then 
exited the 7-Eleven parking lot to the north and walked west down 13th 
North with the car following slowly behind him. R. 208:85-86. 
Diaz-Hernandez identified defendant in court as the person who stomped 
on Lee's head. R. 208:100. 
No other person matching the description given to police by 
Diaz-Hernandez entered the store between 5:00:00 and 6:00:00. 
R. 210:445; Ex. S-2. 
• One other black male entered the store at 5:47, but he was wearing a 
long-sleeved plaid shirt and came from the direction of the gas pumps 
east of the store, not from the north side of the parking lot. R. 210:442-
44; Ex. S-2, 5:47:18. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The evidence sufficed to support the conviction. Gustavo Diaz-Hernandez saw 
the attack, described the attacker, saw the attacker enter the 7-Eleven, and identified 
7 
defendant in court as the attacker. Robert Mellen corroborated Diaz-Hernahdez' 
testimony about the defendant's movements during the relevant time period 
also testified that he saw defendant beckon Lee to him. The surveillance tape 
corroborated both their accounts of defendant's appearance and movements 
and 
between 
5:20 and 5:32 a.m. No other person matching Diaz-Hernandez' descriptiorj of the 
attacker entered or left the 7-Eleven during the relevant time period. 
ARGUMENT 
DIRECT TESTIMONY FROM A CREDIBLE WITNESS IDENTIFYING 
DEFENDANT AS THE MAN WHO STOMPED ON THE VICTIM'S 
HEAD TEN TO TWENTY TIMES, TOGETHER WITH 
CORROBORATING TESTIMONY FROM A SECOND CREDIBLE 
WITNESS AND CORROBORATING VIDEOTAPE EVIDENCE, 
SUFFICED TO SUPPORT THE GUILTY VERDICT 
When reviewing a bench trial for sufficiency of the evidence, the appellate 
court must sustain the trial court's judgment unless, after giving "deference to the 
trial court's ability and opportunity to evaluate credibility and demeanor," the 
appellate court finds that the judgment is "against the clear weight of the evidence" 
or "reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." \State v. 
Goodman, 763 P.2d 786, 786-787 (Utah 1988) (internal quotation marks ahd 
citation omitted). The trier-of-fact may draw reasonable inferences from the 
evidence before it. See State v. Coonce, 2001 UT App 355,^] 6, 36P.3d}33 
8 
A. The judgment in this case is supported by the clear weight of the evidence, 
together with the reasonable inferences that can be drawn from it. 
The trial judge sat as trier-of-fact in this case. She found the defendant guilty 
of murder. R. 211:547-548. She found each element of the crime: she found that 
Lee Lundskog's death was a homicide, that defendant committed the homicide, and 
that defendant acted with the requisite mens rea. Id. at 536-537, 547. In reaching 
this decision, the trial judge also found that the State's witnesses were credible. Id. 
at 546-547 (finding Diaz-Hernandez and Mellen "particularly credible witnesses" 
and "the medical examiner's testimony . . . extraordinarily important"). Defendant 
challenges only the finding that he was the individual who murdered Lee. Br. Aplt. 
at 14, 18,23-24. 
The clear weight of the evidence detailed in the foregoing Statement of the 
Facts supports the trial court's finding that defendant was the murderer. Gustavo 
Diaz-Hernandez testified that he saw an attacker stomping on someone behind the 
dumpster at the 7-Eleven at approximately 5:30 a.m.. R. 208:65-70. He saw the 
attacker stomp on the victim approximately thirteen times, enter the 7-Eleven, and 
return to stomp on the victim four more times. R. 208:65-70, 74-86. He described 
the attacker as a black male wearing a light colored T-shirt, denim shorts, and white 
sneakers. R. 208:71-72. He later identified defendant as the attacker. R. 208:100. 
The in-store video surveillance camera showed defendant wearing the clothing 
described by Diaz-Hernandez. R. 210:426-427, 433. 
9 
Robert Mellen saw both Lee and defendant at the store just before the 
R. 209:241-254. As Mellen was leaving the store at 5:26 a.m., he saw defendant on 
the north side of the store, the side where the garbage dumpster was located, and 
saw defendant beckon Lee toward him. R. 209:247. He identified defendant as the 
murder. 
man he saw motioning Lee to approach. R. 209:242-243. 
The video camera showed Lee moving from south to north across the 
the store, apparently in response to defendant's gestures. R. 210:436; Ex. S-2. The 
video camera also recorded defendant re-entering and re-exiting the store in a 
sequence and time-frame consistent with Diaz-Hernandez's description of ihe 
att -ker's movements. R. .0:439-441; Ex. S-2. Approximately twenty min\ies 
elapsed from the time Lee last passed in front of the camera until Steven Buk ler 
observed Lee lying on the ground dying. R. 209:274, 210:441. 
front of 
In sum, a credible witness saw the crime in progress. He saw defendant 
committing the attack and identified him as the attacker. His testimony was 
corroborated by that of a second credible witness and by unchallenged videotape 
evidence. A third witness found Lee lying on the ground only minutes later. No 
other person resembling the attacker or wearing clothing like that worn by 
attacker entered the 7-Eleven between 5:00 and 6:00 a.m. R. 210:445; Ex. 
the 
S-2. 
10 
This evidence is sufficient to support both the conviction and the underlying 
findings." 
B. Defendant's has not demonstrated that "a mistake has been made." 
Defendant suggests that a mistake has been made. He characterizes various 
comments made by the trial court as "findings." He then argues that (1) the 
evidence does not support certain "findings," (2) the trial court drew improper and 
irrelevant inferences in reaching other "findings," and (3) the evidence was 
insufficiently reliable to support the "findings" related to eyewitness testimony. 
Br. Aplt. at 30, 34, and 39. 
Specifically, defendant objects to certain comments made by the trial judge 
during the court proceeding when she announced her verdict. Defendant identifies 
a group of "findings" ("the first set") and claims that the evidence was insufficient 
to support them. Defendant challenges the trial judge's comments that 
• the motive must have been money, 
"Defendant's cited cases on this issue are unhelpful. See Br. Aplt. at 19-20 (citing 
State v. James, 819 P.2d 781 (Utah 1991), State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443 (Utah 1983), and 
State v. Clayton, 646 P.2d 723 (Utah 1982)). Defendant first argues that the 
circumstantial evidence in this case is inferior to the circumstantial evidence found 
sufficient in two of these cases. Nothing in those opinions, however, suggests that the 
reviewing court determined that the evidence supporting the convictions in those cases 
established a required minimum. Sufficiency issues are fact-intensive, and what is 
sufficient almost always depends on the evidence presented in context. 
Further, even assuming the circumstantial evidence in this case is inferior to the 
circumstantial evidence in one or more of the three cases cited by defendant, those cases, 
founded on circumstantial evidence alone, are distinguishable because the instant case 
involves both circumstantial and direct evidence of the offense. Here, a witness saw 
defendant committing the crime. 
11 
lighting, while imperfect, was sufficient to assist Hernandez in rjiaking 
his observations, 
no cars were at the 7-Eleven at 5:30 a.m., and 
Lee interacted with defendant, left together with defendant, and |was not 
again seen alive. 
Br. Aplt. at 30-34. 
Defendant also claims that the trial court drew improper and irrelevant 
inferences in reaching another group of "findings" ("the second set"). Defendant 
challenges the trial judge's observations that 
items of defendant's clothing seized by police "had a detergent bdor" and 
were "conspicuously clean," 
defendant "went in and out of the 7-Eleven not one time, as he jsaid, but 
three times," 
white tennis shoes were not found at the home where he was li\| ing, 
Mellen observed tension in the 7-Eleven and defendant looked ^t Mellen 
"pretty hard," 
• defendant's undue attention to Mellen suggested that something! was 
amiss, 
• almost everyone has a pair of white athletic shoes in their homd, and 
defendant exhibited a total lack of emotion during trial and "that, coupled 
with everything else, contribute[d] to the verdict." 
Br. Aplt. at 34-37. 
12 
Defendant also claims that the evidence was insufficient to support a group of 
"findings" (the "third set") regarding eyewitness testimony. Defendant summarizes 
the disputed "findings" as follows: 
• "The trial court was aware that eyewitness identification required 
consideration of several factors, including the race of the person 
identified versus the race of the identifying party, timing, problems with 
vision, and emotional tensions," 
"Hernandez witnessed the stomping," 
"he described the attacker and identified him to be [defendant]," 
"Hernandez did not know the attacker of the victim," 
"his eyewitness identification was not 'clouded by a lack of objectivity,"' 
"he saw the face of the victim," 
"Hernandez's physical description of the attacker matched the description 
of [defendant] in the 7-Eleven video," 
"[defendant] was at the store early that morning," and 
"the court found Hernandez and Mellen to be credible witnesses." 
Br. Aplt. at 39-40. 
1. Defendant misapprehends the scope of review. Review is not to determine 
whether the evidence supports every comment made by the trial court, 
but whether it supports the verdict and conviction. 
Defendant first argues that the trial judge, sitting as a finder-of-fact, had a duty 
to make findings. He then characterizes various comments made by the judge in 
connection with her announcement of the verdict as "findings." Finally, defendant 
argues that the "findings" are improper and the conviction should therefore be 
13 
reversed. Review of a sufficiency claim, however, is review of the evidenbe to 
determine whether it supports the conviction, not whether it supports all of the 
fact-finder's comments, musings, and analysis. 
Defendant first cites State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 192-193 (Utah l4>87), for 
his argument that the trial judge, sitting as trier-of-fact, must make findings. In 
Walker, this Court held that the standard of review for a bench trial is sonjewhat 
different than the standard of review for a jury trial. When reviewing the 
sufficiency of evidence supporting a conviction, a reviewing court will overturn a 
jury verdict "only when the evidence is so lacking and insubstantial that a 
reasonable person could not have reached that verdict beyond a reasonable doubt." 
Id. at 192. A reviewing court will overturn a bench trial verdict when the 
"against the clear weight of the evidence" or "if the appellate court otherwise 
reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." Id. 
Defendant implies that Walker requires the trier-of-fact in a bench trial to 
make "findings" and the appellate court to review those findings. Br. Ap: 
Defendant apparently finds support for this claim in rules 52(a) and 81(e) 
Rules of Civil Procedure, cited in Walker. See 743 P.2d at 192. Rule 81 < 
verdict is 
specifies that the rules of civil procedure will "govern in any aspect of criminal 
proceedings where there is no other applicable statute or rule, provided, tnat any 
rule so applied does not conflict with any statutory or constitutional requirement 
Rule 52(a) states that "[i]n all actions tried upon the facts without a jury 
t. at 17. 
Utah 
e) 
. the 
14 
court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law 
thereon." Rule 52(a) further clarifies that the findings and conclusions may be 
stated orally or in an opinion or memorandum decision filed by the court. 
For purposes of this case, the issue is not whether the trial court judge must 
find something, but what exactly the judge must find. Defendant mischaracterizes 
mere comments as findings and ignores that portion of Walker which explains what 
findings are necessary in a criminal bench trial. Delineating the clearly erroneous 
standard of review applicable in a bench trial, this Court stated, "Thus, 
the . . . 'clearly erroneous' standard . . . requires that if the findings (or the trial 
court's verdict in a criminal case) are against the clear weight of the evidence, or if 
the appellate court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake 
has been made, the findings (or verdict) will be set aside." Walker, 743 P.2d at 193 
(parentheticals in original). 
This language clarifies that the only finding required in a criminal bench trial 
is the verdict. Cf. Utah R. Juv. P. 44(a) (providing for announcement of findings of 
fact upon which the court determines material allegations except in cases 
concerning a minor's violation of the law where "findings of fact shall not be 
necessary"). While that verdict is subject to review for clear error, other comments 
made by the trial court are not. Here, the evidence suffices to support the verdict. 
Furthermore, nothing in the record suggests that a mistake has been made. The trial 
judge explained how the evidence led her to conclude that each element of the 
15 
offense had been established beyond a reasonable doubt. While the trial judge is 
not required to make these underlying findings, the findings—together witn the 
evidence supporting them—further emphasize that no mistake was made here. 
The evidence sufficed to support the verdict. The verdict was consistent with 
the clear weight of the evidence. Further, the evidence sufficed to support a finding 
of every element of the offense. Whether it sufficed to support every other 
comment made by the trial court judge is not a relevant inquiry. Cf. State 
2001 UT App 268, ^ *2 (memorandum decision) (observing that defendant 
"mischaracterize[d] . . . comments as findings," then argued that the findin 
insufficient in criminal case, where "findings were neither made nor required") 
(attached as Addendum B); D Aston v. Aston, 844 P.2d 345, 355 (Utah App. 1992) 
(distinguishing a "general remark" or a "generalized comment" from a "conclusive 
v. Nagel, 
gs were 
determination") 
2. Evidence supported the only relevant statement among the first e^t of 
"findings/' Other challenged "findings" were not relevant. 
Even assuming that the challenged comments are findings, defendant! 
establish that the trial court committed reversible error when making them 
Defendant claims that the evidence failed to support the first set of findings. Only 
one of these findings—that the lighting, while imperfect, was sufficient to 
Diaz-Hernandez to identify defendant—was relevant to the single contested issue, 
i.e., the attacker's identity. The evidence sufficed to support that relevant] 
fails to 
allow 
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statement. R. 208:42-43, 101, 114, 117, 119-120; 211:543; Exs. S-23-26. The 
other challenged "findings" are irrelevant to the issue of identity or so minor as to 
be insubstantial: 
• While the trial court observed that robbery was probably the motive for 
the crime, the trial court also correctly noted that the State need not prove 
motive as an element. R. 211:538. Any finding about motive was 
therefore irrelevant. 
• The trial court stated that there were no cars in the 7-Eleven at 5:30 a.m. 
R. 211:544. The trial court's failure to note that Augustin Castaneda, 
another witness, pulled into the 7-Eleven at 5:30 is inconsequential when 
compared with the details of the offense. R. 210:437-438. 
• True, the trial court erred in commenting that after Lee and defendant left 
together, Lee was never again seen alive. R. 209:544. The trial court's 
failure to note that Butcher saw Lee's body while Lee was barely alive, 
however, is an inconsequential error. R. 209:269-270. 
3. Any improper inferences drawn in the second set of findings are 
irrelevant. 
Defendant quibbles about other minor matters, again irrelevant to the issue of 
identity, in claiming that the trial court drew improper and irrelevant inferences in 
reaching the second set of findings. 
• Whether defendant's clothing had a detergent odor, whether defendant 
looked at Robert Mellen "pretty hard," and whether defendant's undue 
attention to Mellen suggested that something was amiss are minor matters 
and also reasonable inferences. 
• Whether defendant told Detective James Prior that he went in and out of 
the 7-Eleven only once or merely that he thought he went in and out only 
once, whether he had made his home with his girlfriend or was just 
staying there temporarily, and whether almost everyone has a pair of 
white athletic shoes at home are also minor matters and, if inaccurate, 
harmless commentary. 
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The trier-of-fact's observation that defendant exhibited a total lack of 
emotion during the trial is not improper. R. 211:547. Nothing suggests 
that fact finders cannot observe defendants during trial. Defendant's 
citation to a case, holding that prosecutors cannot ask fact finders to 
consider that an accused "sat and showed no emotion" is inapposite. Br. 
Aplt. at 38 (citing Reed v. State, 197 So.2d 811, 815 (Miss. 1967)). 
There, the court noted, such argument can be tantamount to comment on 
a defendant's failure to testify. See Reed, 197 So.2d at 815. Here, the 
trial judge explicitly stated that she did not consider defendant's! failure to 
testify in reaching her verdict. R. 211:547. 
4. The eyewitness testimony was constitutionally reliable. 
Defendant attacks the sufficiency of the evidence indirectly, arguing that the 
third set of findings that "relate to [Diaz-Hernandez'] 'eyewitness' testimony" were 
based on unreliable evidence. 
Defendant implicitly argues that the trial court should have rejected the 
eyewitness testimony as unreliable under the factors set forth in State v. Ramirez, 
817 P.2d 774, 782-784 (Utah 1991) Ramirez requires a trial court to reviiw 
eyewitness identification to determine whether it is sufficiently reliable to submit to 
a jury. Id. at 780. In making that determination, the trial court must consider the 
following factors: 
• "the opportunity of the witness to view the actor during the event," 
• "the witness's degree of attention to the actor at the time of the 
• "the witness's capacity to observe the event," 
event,' 
"whether the witness's identification was made spontaneously and 
remained consistent thereafter, or whether it was the product of 
suggestion," and 
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"the nature of the event being observed and the likelihood that the 
witness would perceive, remember and relate it correctly." 
Ramirez, 817 P.3d at 781 (citing and quoting State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 493 
(Utah 1986) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
Ramirez followed State v. Long, 721 P.2d at 483, which requires a trial court 
to give a cautionary instruction regarding eyewitness testimony whenever it is 
requested. See Long, 721 P.2d at 492. Both Ramirez and Long responded to 
scientific evidence suggesting that jurors are, for the most part, unaware of the 
weaknesses inherent in eyewitness identification. Their requirements guide and 
limit the jury's use of eyewitness identification to prevent conviction on the basis of 
identification testimony that may appear dispositive to a juror only because he or 
she has not been informed of conditions conducive to misidentification. 
Nothing in Ramirez or Long suggests that trial judges are ignorant of the 
potential weakness of eyewitness testimony. In any case, the trial court judge here 
was clearly aware of the reliability concerns. She stated, "I am very much aware 
under State v. Long that eyewitness identification is suspect." R. 211:539. She 
noted that "[e]yewitness identification has to be carefully considered in view of 
things such as the lighting, the race of the individual being identified versus the 
race of the person doing the identification, the time one has to see the individual, 
whether or not one has problems with their vision, [and] the emotions or tensions 
that are aroused in people when they do the observation." Id. at 539-540. 
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She then assessed Diaz-Hernandez' testimony in the light of the Ramirez 
factors. She found that Diaz-Hernandez "had very good eyesight," that he| reported 
the attack to a coworker almost immediately after he viewed it, that he kn^w neither 
the victim nor the attacker and had no reason to lack objectivity, that he 
threatened nor suffering while making his observations, that lighting was 
was 
although not perfect, and that his failure to identify defendant in a photo spread did 
not invalidate his later in-court identification of defendant. R. 211:540, 543. 
Further, she observed that Diaz-Hernandez' identification of defendant was 
corroborated by the videotape and by Robert Mellen, who had identified defendant 
not 
dequate 
from the photo spread. R. 211:543-546. 
After considering these factors, the trial court determined "under the totality of 
the circumstances," that the eyewitness identification was reliable and, together with 
other evidence, sufficient to support a guilty finding. See Ramirez, 817 P.M at 774, 
781 (concluding that "ultimate question to be determined is whether, under the 
totality of the circumstances, the identification was reliable"); see also R. 211:537, 
547 (stating that trial judge's decision was based on the totality of the facts and 
evidence in this case). 
The evidence in this case was both constitutionally reliable and sufficient to 
support the verdict. Nothing suggests that the judgment is "against the cl^ar weight 
of the evidence" or that "a mistake has been made." 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
76-5-203. Murder. 
(1) As used in this section, "predicate offense" means: 
(a) violation of Section 58-37d-4 or 58-37d-5, Clandestine Drug Lab Act; 
(b) child abuse, under Subsection 76-5-109(2)(a), when the victim is younger than 18 years of age; 
(c) kidnapping under Section 76-5-301; 
(d) child kidnapping under Section 76-5-301.1; 
(e) aggravated kidnapping under Section 76-5-302; 
(0 rape of a child under Section 76-5-402.1; 
(g) object rape of a child under Section 76-5-402.3; 
(h) sodomy upon a child under Section 76-5-403.1; 
(i) forcible sexual abuse under Section 76-5-404; 
(j) sexual abuse of a child or aggravated sexual abuse of a child under Section 76-5-404.1; 
(k) rape under Section 76-5-402; 
(1) object rape under Section 76-5-402.2; 
(m) forcible sodomy under Section 76-5-403; 
(n) aggravated sexual assault under Section 76-5-405; 
(o) arson under Section 76-6-102; 
(p) aggravated arson under Section 76-6-103; 
(q) burglary under Section 76-6-202; 
(r) aggravated burglary under Section 76-6-203; 
(s) robbery under Section 76-6-301; 
(t) aggravated robbery under Section 76-6-302; or 
(u) escape or aggravated escape under Section 76-8-309. 
(2) Criminal homicide constitutes murder if: 
(a) the actor intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another; 
(b) intending to cause serious bodily injury to another, the actor commits an act clearly dangerous to 
human life that causes the death of another; 
(c) acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to human life, the actor engages in 
conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another and thereby causes the death of another; 
(d) (i) the actor is engaged in the commission, attempted commission, or immediate flight from the 
commission or attempted commission of any predicate offense, or is a party to the predicate offense; and 
(ii) a person other than a party as defined in Section 76-2-202 is killed in the course of the 
commission, attempted commission, or immediate flight from the commission or attempted commission 
of any predicate offense; 
(e) the actor recklessly causes the death of a peace officer while in the commission or attempted 
commission of: 
(i) an assault against a peace officer under Section 76-5-102.4; or 
(ii) interference with a peace officer while making a lawful arrest under Section 76-8-305 if the actor 
uses force against a peace officer; 
(f) commits a homicide which would be aggravated murder, but the offense is reduced pursuant to 
Subsection 76-5-202(3); or 
(g) the actor commits aggravated murder, but special mitigation is established under Section 76-5-
205.5. 
(3) Murder is a first degree felony. 
(4) (a) It is an affirmative defense to a charge of murder or attempted murder that the defendant 
caused the death of another or attempted to cause the death of another: 
(i) under the influence of extreme emotional distress for which there is a reasonable explanation or 
excuse; or 
(ii) under a reasonable belief that the circumstances provided a legal justification or excuse for his 
conduct although the conduct was not legally justifiable or excusable under the existing bircumstances. 
(b) Under Subsection (4)(a)(i) emotional distress does not include: 
(i) a condition resulting from mental illness as defined in Section 76-2-305; or 
(ii) distress that is substantially caused by the defendant's own conduct. 
(c) The reasonableness of an explanation or excuse under Subsection (4)(a)(i) or the Reasonable beliet" 
of the actor under Subsection (4)(a)(ii) shall be determined from the viewpoint of a reasonable person 
under the then existing circumstances. 
(d) This affirmative defense reduces charges only as follows: 
(i) murder to manslaughter; and 
(ii) attempted murder to attempted manslaughter. 
Amended by Chapter 125, 2000 General Session 
Amended by Chapter 101, 2000 General Session 
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ADDENDUM B 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
-—00O00— 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Donald David Nagel, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20000649-CA 
F I L E D 
September 13,2001 
|l 2001 UTApp268 [[ 
Fifth District, Cedar City Department 
The Honorable Robert T. Braithwaite 
Attorneys: 
J. Bryan Jackson, Cedar City, for Appellant 
Scott M. Burns, Cedar City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Greenwood, Davis, and Thome. 
DAVIS, Judge: 
Nagel first argues that the prosecution did not prove the requisite criminal intent to support his conviction for 
reckless driving pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-45(1 )(a) (Supp. 2000). If an offense does not involve strict 
liability, then a culpable mental state is required to establish criminal responsibility. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-
102 (1999). Utah's reckless driving statute establishes that "willful or wanton" is the culpable mental state for that 
crime. Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-45(1 )(a). As Nagel indicates, the Utah Supreme Court addressed the meaning of 
the term "willful" in State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355 (Utah 1993). "Willful, when applied to the intent with which an 
act is done or omitted, implies a willingness to commit the a c t . . . . Willful does not require an intent to violate the 
law. . . . " Idat1358n.3. 
Here, the evidence established that Nagel pulled off the road in heavy traffic causing other cars to swerve around 
him, crossed the double yellow line to pass other cars, and wove in and out of traffic. Although he may not have 
specifically intended to endanger others, he willingly engaged in acts that endangered other persons and 
property. Therefore, Nagel's conduct was sufficient to establish the requisite criminal intent to support his 
conviction for reckless driving. 
Nagel also argues that the reckless driving statute is unconstitutionally vague. "When reviewing the 
constitutionality of a statute, we must presume that the statute is constitutional." State v. Krueger, 1999 UT App 
54, fl21, 975 P 2d 489. "[A] statute is not unconstitutionally vague if it is sufficiently explicit to infprm the ordinary 
reader what conduct is prohibited . . . ." Id. at 1J23. 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-45(1 )(a) provides that a person is guilty of reckless driving when that person operates a 
vehicle "in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property." In construing the language of this 
statute, "it is to be assumed that the words used were chosen advisedly, and terms should be given an 
interpretation and an application in accord with their commonly understood meaning." Nephi City v. Hansen. 779 
P.2d 673, 675 (Utah 1989). ~ r 
Although section 41-6-45(1 )(a) prohibits a broad range of activities, it is not unconstitutionally v&gue. Specifically, 
the phrase "disregard for the safety of persons or property" is sufficiently explicit to inform the ordinary person 
what conduct is prohibited because, in the context of operating a motor vehicle, it is commonly understood what 
activities would endanger persons or property.1'' Utah Code Ann. § 41 -6-45(1 )(a). Thus, an ordinary person would 
understand what conduct is prohibited. 
Nagel next argues that the trial court erred in its assessment of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight it 
ascribed to their testimony. The trial court is free to believe the testimony of the prosecution's witnesses over that 
of the defendant's because the trial court is in the best position to determine the credibility of the witnesses. See 
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). Further, it is improper for this court to "weigh conflicting evidence, 
the credibility of witnesses, or the weight to be given appellant's testimony." State v. Logan, 56p P.2d 811, 813 
(Utah 1977). Thus, we uphold the trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses and it^ weighing of the 
evidence. 
In an apparent effort to explain its decision, the trial court commented on witness credibility. M^characterizing 
these comments as findings, Nagel argues that the trial court's "findings" regarding the testimony of the witnesses 
were insufficient to justify its decision. Although findings were neither made nor required in this case, the court 
discounted the testimony of the defense witnesses. The court noted that all of the defense witnesses gave 
identical testimony regarding what was supposedly "an unremarkable event." The court further commented that it 
doubted the testimony of one defense witness because the witness could recall events that occurred several 
months before the trial; however, the witness "just froze up when asked what she . . .talkfed] about" during a 
break in the trial that day. In contrast, the court determined that the prosecution witnesses were credible, noting 
that there was no "need or basis for fabrication by the prosecution witnesses." Accordingly, we conclude that the 
comments are "sufficiently comprehensive and pertinent to the issues to provide a basis for decision" and are not 
inconsistent therewith. State v. Hurst, 821 P.2d 467, 471 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Affirmed. 
James Z. Davis, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
Pamela T. Greenwood, 
Presiding Judge 
?/26/2(X» 
William A. Thome, Jr., Judge 
1. The State strives to ensure such a common understanding by requiring all drivers to pass a written driver's test 
before they are issued a driver's license. 
